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Summary:  This  article  discusses  key  political
issues surrounding Japan’s Legislation for Peace
and Security that came into effect on 29 March
2016. The past two years have seen heated public
debate  and  political  protests  with  opposition
parties  uniting  in  their  opposition  to  the
legislation in their attempt to challenge the LDP-
Komeito  ruling  coalition  in  the  July  10  Upper
House election. This challenge continues. In this
article,  I  discuss  opposition  claims  that  the
security legislation is ‘war legislation’ that poses
a  threat  to  Japan’s  pacifist  Constitution.  I  also
discuss the central role played by Komeito in the
passage of this legislation and examine the often
antagonistic  relationship between the LDP and
its junior coalition partner, which is often ignored
in the simplified narratives of the choice between
‘war and peace’ played out in the public sphere.
This  article,  therefore,  addresses  not  only  the
legislation  but  also  public  perceptions  and
misperceptions  of  the  issues  involved and the
underlying political process.
Despite the push for more fundamental change
and the heated rhetoric  that  followed the July
2014  Abe  Cabinet  Decision  on  the  security
legislation and its enactment in September 2015,
this article argues that it was a centrist pragmatic
development in Japanese politics  rather than a
radical  change,  due  in  large  part  to  the
moderating influence of Komeito.1
Keywords:  Japan’s  Constitution,  Article  9,
constitutionality,  historical  memory,  war
legislation  and  the  public.
Politics and its representations
The introduction of Japan’s Legislation for Peace
and Security  (平和安全法制Heiwa anzen hōsei)
has  brought  about  increased  political  activism
amongst groups who believe that its embrace of
the notion of  collective self-defence (CSD) is  a
throwback to Japan’s imperial past and a betrayal
of  Article  9  of  the Constitution that  renounces
war and the use of force in settling international
disputes. The debates surrounding the legislation
have  become  increasingly  polarised,  reflecting
the different visions of Japan as a nation held by
ideologies on the left and the right. In this article,
I look beneath the polemics and the rhetoric to
examine to what extent Komeito, also known as
the Clean Government Party, has succeeded in
acting as a brake on Prime Minister Abe Shinzō
and the majority of the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP)  who  seek  a  full-fledged  collective  self-
defence policy and the revision of Article 9.
John Dewey, the American educational reformer
who  wrote  in  great  detail  about  democracy,
argued that the presence of a public that could
evaluate  and  judge  politics  in  an  informed
manner was crucial to the practical working of
the democratic process. However, he also noted
that  citizens  were  often  ill-equipped  to
understand the complex details of policies and,
while repudiating Walter Lippmann’s notion of
the  public  as  a  non-existent  ‘phantom’,2  also
described the public as at times ‘a ghost which
walks  and  talks,  and  obscures,  confuses  and
misleads  governmental  action  in  a  disastrous
way.’3 The many conspicuous street protests that
have arisen in Japan in recent years indicate that
at  least  parts  of  the public  are alive and well.
Often  lauded  as  indicating  the  rise  of  civil
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society, this part of the public has presented itself
as the voice of people in its strong opposition to
the  current  government  and  the  security
legislation  that  it  views  as  a  gateway to  war.
How does  the  public  with  its  multiple  voices
speak  to  complicated  legislative  issues?  This
question  is  particularly  relevant  when  public
discourse is polarised and constructed so as to
render  a  nuanced  and  informed  debate  of
security issues almost impossible.
The right-leaning Yomiuri Shimbun in an article
titled ‘SDF activities should be expanded to deal
seamlessly  with  threats  to  Japan’  (22  March
2015)4 criticised the proposed security legislation
under discussion between the LDP and Komeito
for  imposing  too  many  limitations  on  what
Japan’s military could and could not do. These
restrictions were primarily the result of pressure
exerted by Komeito.  For example,  whereas the
LDP had not wanted any limits on the logistical
aid that Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDF) could
provide  to  its  security  partners,  this  was
criticised by its opponents and, in the end, the
LDP was forced to accept the stricter limitations
proposed  by  Komeito.  The  criticism  of  such
limitations  articulated  by  the  Yomiuri  article
reinforced the view of Komeito politicians that
they had achieved significant success as a result
of their hundreds of hours of negotiation with
the LDP.
The  opposition  parties,  on  the  other  hand,
opposed  the  legislation  for  going  too  far  by
allowing  Japan  to  engage  in  collective  self-
defence (CSD) of its allies, even if it was not itself
under threat. By paving the way for the SDF to
use force overseas to defend Japan’s allies,  the
legislation was viewed by its critics as a return to
the militarism of the past and was labelled ‘war
legislation’  that  undermined  Japan’s  post-war
position as a peaceful nation.
Since  its  inception  in  1964,  Komeito’s  most
significant  role  in  contemporary  Asian
geopolitics has been its  diplomatic efforts over
several decades to promote good relations with
China ,  and  i t  was  a  major  force  in  the
normalisation  of  Japan-China  relations  in  the
early 1970s.5 It is backed by arguably the largest
and most enduring grassroots peace movement
in Japan, the Nichiren Buddhist movement Soka
Gakkai,  whose  founder  and  current  honorary
president,  Daisaku  Ikeda  (b.1928)  called  for
normalising relations with China as early as 1968.
Soka Gakkai  has itself  engaged for  decades in
building  civil  ties  and  diplomatic  connections
with counterparts in China, while serving as the
main support base for Komeito.
Protesters I have interviewed at demonstrations
against the security legislation, such as those that
have  taken  place  in  front  of  the  Japanese
parliament,  have  invariably  described Komeito
as ‘just the same as the LDP’ and regarded it as
complicit in the passing of ‘war legislation’. This
perception  that  Komeito  has  betrayed  its
fundamental commitment to peace presents the
party with a profound conundrum.
The term ‘war legislation’ has been consistently
used by  the  Japanese  Communist  Party  (JCP),
which has become the most strident opposition
voice and the main organiser of demonstrations.
The  war  label  has  also  been  used  by  other
opposition parties. For instance, during rallies for
the  Upper  House  election  in  July  2016,
Democratic Party candidate Ogawa Toshio, who
was  narrowly elected in  sixth  place  in  Tokyo,
campaigned against allowing Japan to go to war
and  the  ruling  parties  from  achieving  a  two-
thirds majority that he claimed would result in a
revision of the Constitution.6
The media alluded to the idea of ‘war legislation’
early on; for example, the headline of The Japan
Times on 30 June 2014, the day before the Cabinet
Decision on the legislation, read: ‘Japan on verge
of legalising war as Komeito bends’.7 But was this
an  accurate  descr ipt ion  of  Komeito ’s
position—and  of  the  legislation  itself?
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The first step in assessing the justification for the
label ‘war legislation’ must be based on whether
the legislation allows Japan to wage war. Article
9  of  the  Japanese  Constitution  prohibits  Japan
from engaging in the threat or use of force except
for the purpose of its own self-defence. So has
this position been fundamentally changed by the
new  legislation?  Komeito  maintains  that  the
answer is ‘No’ and that Japan’s renunciation of
war and exclusively defensive security policy (専
守防衛senshu bōei )  remains intact.  One of the
purposes of this article is to assess this claim.
A brief outline of the legislation and chronology
of events
The security legislation is made up of two parts:
1)  Japan’s  Legislation  for  Peace  and  Security
consists of 11 bills that amend existing laws, and
2) a new International Peace Support Law that
enables  the  dispatch  of  SDF  troops  abroad  to
provide  logistical  support  for  the  military
operations of other countries.  According to the
government,  the  legislation  enables  Japan  to
make  ‘seamless  responses  to  any  situations  to
secure the lives and peaceful  livelihood of  the
Japanese  people’  and  makes  it  possible  to
‘contribute  more  proactively  to  the  peace  and
security  of  the  international  community.’8  It
involves amendments to the following laws:
1) Self-Defence Forces Act (SDF Act)
2)  International  Peace  Cooperation
Law (Law Concerning Cooperation
for  United  Nations  Peace-keeping
Operations  and  Other  Operations)
(PKO Law)
3)  Law  concerning  measures  to
ensure  the  peace  and  security  of
Japan in areas surrounding Japan
4) Ship Inspection Operations Act
5)  Law  regarding  response  to
armed-attack situations (include the
use  of  force  under  three  new
conditions)
6)  Act  on  measures  conducted  by
the  government  in  line  with  US
military  actions  in  armed-attack
situations
7) Law concerning the use of specific
public facilities
8) Marine Transport Restriction Act
9) Act on the Treatment of Prisoners
of  War  and  Other  Detainees  in
Armed Attack Situations
10)  National  Security  Council
Establishment  Act
Chronology of events:
15 May 2014: Advisory panel on the
lega l  bas i s  fo r  the  secur i ty
legislation  submits  its  report  to
Prime  Minister  Abe.9
20 May 2014: First meeting between
the  LDP  and  Komeito  on  the
legislation, followed by six weeks of
frequent  meetings  and  intense
discussion.
1  July  2014:  Cabinet  Decision  on
Three  New  Conditions  for  Self
Defence.
24  Dec.  2014:  Third  Abe  Cabinet
established after general election.
13 Feb. 2015: Meetings between the
LDP and Komeito resume.
27  Apr.  2015:  New  guidelines
announced  for  Japan-US  defence
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cooperation.
14 May 2015: The LDP and Komeito
reach  agreement  on  Japan’s
Legislation on Peace and Security; a
Cabinet Decision is made.
15  May  2015 :  Legis la t ion  i s
submitted to the Lower House.
2 2  May  2 0 1 5 :  1 1 6  h ou r s  o f
deliberation  in  the  Lower  House
begins.
16 Jul. 2015: Legislation is passed in
the Lower House.
2 7  J u l .  2 0 1 5 :  1 0 0  h ou r s  o f
deliberation  in  the  Upper  House
begins.
17 Sep. 2015: Legislation is passed in
the Upper House.
19 Sep. 2015: Legislation enacted.
29  Mar.  2016:  Legislation  takes
effect.
 
Japan’s political ghosts
War  is  the  political  ghost  of  Japan’s  national
politics,  a  historical  memory  that  continues  to
shape political discourse on national identity and
the imagined future. Central to such discourse is
Japan’s  1947  post-war  Constitution.  This  legal
document  and  the  interpretation  of  its  war-
renouncing  Article  9  have  taken  on  shifting
contours over the years for political groups on
both the left and the right. These underpin the
many rhetorical battles about national legitimacy.
In 1951-2, Japan and the US struck a bargain on
security strategy whereby the US guaranteed to
defend Japan amidst  rising Cold War tensions
and,  in  return,  was  permitted  to  build  and
maintain military bases in Japan.  This  security
alliance with the US became fundamental to the
way that Japan approached its foreign policy. It
meant  that  Japan  did  not  need  to  undertake
costly offensive capability and nuclear weapons.
Despite  Article  9  that  prohibits  Japan  from
maintaining  military  forces,  the  Self-Defence
Forces were established in 1954 after the Korean
War (1950-53)  amidst  rising Cold War tension.
This ‘defence-only’ position that enabled Japan to
focus  on  economic  development  while  it
outsourced its defence needs to the US came to
be  referred  to  as  the  ‘Yoshida  doctrine’,10  a
position that dominated foreign policy until 1990.
Over the past twenty years, the constitutionality
of  the  existence  of  the  SDF  has  come  to  be
accepted as the status quo by the vast majority of
the  general  public  and  by  almost  all  political
parties  apart  from  the  Japanese  Communist
Party. Although the JCP is now one of the fiercest
critics of the current security legislation, the party
opposed Article 9 until 1994, due to its ultimate
aim of establishing a communist government in
Japan backed by a ‘revolutionary military force
(kakumei bōeitai). The JCP now adopts a pacifist
position with the abolishment of the SDF as one
of  its  stated aims,11  although it  has  adopted a
more  pragmatic  stance  towards  the  security
treaty with the US and the temporary need for
the SDF in order to enable cooperation with other
political  parties  in  opposing  the  security
legislation.12
Despite  widespread  support  for  Article  9,  the
existence of the SDF has been widely accepted as
necessary  by  the  majority  of  people  in  Japan.
Public support for the SDF has been strengthened
by the significant  role  that  it  plays in  disaster
relief and rescue operations in Japan, particularly
since the Tohoku triple disaster of March 2011.
Public support has also increased for the role that
the  SDF  has  played  in  UN  peacekeeping
operations (PKO) overseas since 1992.  Komeito
has been a major supporter of these activities and
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was a key political player in ensuring the passage
of  the  PKO  legislation  in  1992,  for  which  it
received much criticism at  the time.  Following
this, it was necessary to enact special measures
bills on each occasion that the SDF were involved
in  PKO  operations,  but  now  the  temporary
legislation used over the past twenty years has
become permanent law under the new security
legislation.
During  the  negotiations  on  the  security
legislation,  Kitagawa Kazuo,  a  member  of  the
Lower  House  who  led  the  discussions  for
Komeito,  pushed  for  specific  controls  on  the
dispatch of SDF personnel for PKO purposes. In
an interview in the party’s newspaper, Kitagawa
explained Komeito’s approach as follows:
By  making  a  permanent  law,  the
Self-Defence  Forces  can  conduct
drills and prepare their personnel in
peacetime, which will  enable them
to  swiftly  coordinate  with  the
United Nations and other countries
and  conduct  on-site  research  and
other activities in preparation for an
emergency  situation  that  threatens
the  peace  and  stability  of  the
international  community.  This
would allow us to choose roles and
tasks  appropriate  for  the  Self-
Defence  Forces.
This might appear to grant the government a free
hand in dispatching the SDF forces, but Kitagawa
explains that this is not the case:
Komeito  proposed  the  following
three  principles  to  put  brakes  on
overseas dispatch of SDF personnel:
1)  legitimacy  under  international
law;  2)  public  understanding  and
democratic  control;  3)  securing the
safety of SDF personnel.
In  terms  of  legitimacy  under
international  law  the  permanent
legislation  will  require  consistency
with  the  United  Nations  Security
Council  resolutions  and  other
relevant  resolutions,  reflecting
Komeito’s emphasis on the fact that
earlier  special  measures  legislation
was created on that basis.
Kome i to  ha s  a l so  s t rong ly
emphasised  public  understanding
and democratic control through the
involvement  of  the  Diet  in  the
process. As a result, every overseas
dispatch of the Self-Defence Forces
would  require  Diet  approval  in
advance  without  exception.  In
addition,  the  extension  of  any
dispatch after two years would have
to be approved by the Diet.13
The extent to which the SDF can bear arms, the
conditions  under  which  they  can  use  them
during peace-keeping operations and the extent
to which they can aid other countries with whom
they undertake such operations have been much
debated.  Nakano  Kōichi,  a  political  science
professor  at  Sophia  University,  is  a  prominent
critic of the security legislation and of the Abe
government in general, focusing on the issue of
constitutionality. In an interview, he voiced his
concern about the safety of PKO personnel and
the danger of SDF embroilment in battle.14
Jimbo Ken, a former foreign policy advisor to the
DPJ during their time in power (2009-12) and a
current  government  advisor  and  assistant
professor  at  Keio  University,  argues  that  PKO
personnel  operate  in  a  vastly  different
environment from twenty years ago and need to
be able to defend themselves. He does not view
the security legislation as a drastic change from
previous policy,15  noting that the previous LDP
administration  under  Prime  Minister  Koizumi
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(2001-06) and later the DPJ government all built
up Japan’s anti-ballistic missile defence system in
cooperation with the US.16
The geopolitical changes that began in the 1990s
with the end of the Cold War have brought about
different suggestions as to how to deal with the
complexity of the Asian region today, in which a
major  factor  is  the  rise  of  China  and  its
militarisation  of  the  South  China  Sea. 1 7
Rhetorically,  left-right  positions  run  along
ideological  lines  that  intersect  with  historical
memory, and different interpretations of Japan’s
imperial history, on both sides, and often entail a
simplification of an extremely complex history of
aggressive warfare. For example, the crucial role
that public opinion and the mass media played in
the  1930s  and  40s  in  shaping  nationalist
sentiment in support of war overseas is largely
ignored.18
The examples in the following sections serve to
illustrate  how the  political  ghosts  of  the  past
continue to shape political debates about security
in 2016.
Defenders  of  ‘the  ethnic  nation’  denounce  the
Abe administration
It is a sunny Sunday morning in April 2016 and a
strident voice can be heard from loudspeakers in
front of Ikebukuro station in central Tokyo. It is a
message of frustration over the lack of progress
made by the Abe administration in changing the
Constitution to allow a greater role for the SDF in
protecting Japan. Right-wing activism involving
trucks  fitted  with  loudspeakers  is  a  common
urban phenomenon in  modern Japan.  With its
display  of  masculine  strength  resembling  a
martial art, it addresses a public that is perceived
as  unwilling  or  unable  to  recognise  Japan’s
primordial heritage.19 ‘Our land is sacred. This is
about protecting our land. This is our mission as
Japanese!’  a  man declares  from the top of  the
truck, holding a large Japanese flag. Other trucks
are  lined  up,  all  decorated  with  numerous
banners and Japanese flags several metres long.
‘To protect the Emperor . . . this is what it means
to be Japanese, isn’t it?’ he asks rhetorically, as if
scolding people for having forgotten their duty.
‘Being Japanese isn’t  just about making money
and buying whatever you like. Please, everyone,
be aware that we need to revise the Constitution.’
One of the slogans on the banners reads: ‘Abolish
the Abe administration!’ and is accompanied by a
drawing of a shamefaced Prime Minster Abe. The
man continues, ‘They have failed to protect Japan
yet  again,  just  like  the  DPJ  with  the  Senkaku
Islands  …’  Nathaniel  Smith  argues  that  such
right-wing  groups  base  their  rhetoric  on  an
idiosyncratic mix of pre-war ideology and post-
war  geopolitics  and  that  such  ‘sonic  activism
helps  to  shape  the  social  dynamics  of  their
movement  and helps  activists  to  construct  the
illusive  object  of  their  activism:  the  ethnic
nation.’20
Although, in recent decades, right-wing groups
have been the most visible and prominent form
of activism, other types of street protest have also
become common since  the  Fukushima  nuclear
accident in March 2011. Many of these protests
have been about the security legislation and the
Constitution, but for different reasons from those
described above.
Right-wing group in front of Ikebukuro station in April 2016
Defenders of peace and democracy denounce the
Abe administration
Since  April  2011  Friday  night  has  become  a
regular  protest  night  for  many  people  who
gather in front of the Japanese parliament; they
use megaphones to chant slogans and opposition
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party leaders come to give speeches. The content
of their message is very different from the right-
wing rhetoric described above, but the target of
their protest is the same: the Abe administration.
Here, criticism of the government is centred not
on any supposed failure  to  protect  ‘the  ethnic
nation’  but  on its  alleged willingness  to  go to
war.
Many  of  these  protesters  view  themselves  as
defenders of a democracy that is threatened by
Prime Minister Abe. On this Friday evening in
April  2016,  several  hundred  people  have
gathered  to  protest  against  the  restarting  of  a
nuclear power plant in a region recently struck
by  a  series  of  powerful  earthquakes.  Most  of
them  are  regular  attendees  and  many  are  of
retirement age in their mid-60s to late 70s; hence
they remember the more radical student protests
of the late 1960s and early 1970s.21 One woman
tells me that she has been coming faithfully every
Friday night for the past five years,  ever since
these protests began. She is a pensioner but still
contributes 1,000 yen every week to help finance
posters  and  other  costs  of  such  events.  Some
younger faces are visible in the crowd, but only a
few.  The  woman  explains  that  the  Students
Emergency  Action  for  Liberal  Democracy
(SEALDs),  a student group established in May
2015,  is  not  present  as  they  are  organising  to
oppose the security legislation in June before the
upcoming  Upper  House  election.22  She  also
expresses her concern about people who are poor
in Japan,  who have few job opportunities  and
feel betrayed by the current government—these
are  all  reasons  for  her  attendance  at  the
demonstrations  in  addition  to  the  security
legislation. ‘Why do you oppose it?’  I  ask her.
‘Because Abe wants to go to war. His economic
plan has had no effect, so the only way is to go to
war.  People  who  come  here  oppose  the  Abe
administration’s  policies,  but  although for  five
years we’ve shouted, “Stop nuclear power!” and
“Abolish war legislation!” nothing changes.’
‘What  do  you  think  about  the  idea  that  the
current legislation is only a gradual expansion of
the role played by the SDF forces and that it is
only a limited form of collective self-defence?’ I
ask. ‘Well, I agree that the situation with North
Korea is dangerous, but if everyone responds to
each other by force (chikara de) there will be no
solution,  only  escalation.  So  it  should  be  our
police  force  that  protects  Japan,  not  the SDF.23
Japan should not be allowed to go to war with
other countries. Of course, it can’t be helped if it
is in self-defence, but Japan can’t go off to fight in
Afghanistan  or  against  the  Islamic  State  and
suchlike.  Japan  hasn’t  engaged  in  war  for  70
years.  Yes,  I  know that  America  is  protecting
Japan, but that is not the only reason. Japan is a
country that does not engage in war.’
‘What  do  you  think  of  the  PKO  activities
undertaken by the SDF?’  I  ask.  Until  last  year
what the PKO did was okay, but now with the
new law they can carry weapons.’ ‘But aren’t the
weapons just for self-defence?’ I inquire. ‘Yes, but
once you go into a combat zone, you can’t avoid
conflict and engaging in war’.
Protesters in front of the Diet in June 2015
Nakano  Kōichi,  mentioned  previously  as  an
intellectual driving force behind the opposition
to the security legislation, stresses that there are
many other things Japan can do to contribute to
the international community,  such as taking in
more refugees, instead of directly taking part in
PKO  activities.  He  has  been  involved  in
establishing  a  new  think  tank  called  Remos
together with students from SEALDs,24 who have
been trying to make politics appear relevant and
‘cool’ among their largely disinterested peers by
using  up-to-date  designs,  colours  and  hip-hop
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music  to  communicate  their  message.  SEALDs
placards  were  clearly  visible  in  support  of
opposition  candidates  in  the  Upper  House
election,  such  as  Ogawa  Toshio  mentioned
previously.  25
Democratic Party supporters of Ogawa Toshio in July 2016
Remos  aims  to  create  unity  among liberals  in
protecting  parliamentary  democracy  from  the
Abe  administration,  which  it  portrays  as
authoritarian and undemocratic.26 The slogans of
‘collective  defence’  and ‘war  legislation’  evoke
strong responses in supporters for whom Article
9 is a passionately held symbol of peace.27 With
few legal or historical specifics, it is possible to
narrow political discourse and represent a very
complex situation as a choice between war and
peace.  Given this  choice,  there  are  few people
who would opt for anything other than peace.
Nakano recognises that political messages have
been simplified but sees this as a pragmatic use
of available means to mobilise people who would
otherwise take no interest in politics.28
A simple question of peace versus war?
The  DPJ  spent  three  years  in  government
advocating changes that were more far-reaching
and included a greater capacity for collective self-
defence  than  the  current  security  legislation
allows. Their current opposition to the legislation
therefore comes as something of a surprise. The
DPJ’s  former  vice  minister  for  defence,
Nagashima  Akihisa,  laments  the  fact  that  the
issues are being fought on a joint platform with
the JCP based on the argument that legislation
which allows CSD ‘is shameful and will not make
the Democratic Party appear a viable alternative
for  government,’  laments.  ‘We  should  have
chosen  to  engage  in  a  much  more  substantial
debate on the actual law itself rather than become
an oppositional force like the JCP without much
say in the actual policy outcome. We need the
right to CSD to deal  with current geo-political
reality.’29
Former DPJ Defence Minister Morimoto Satoshi
also disagrees with the DP’s current stance and
views  the  security  legislation  as  a  step  in  the
right direction, while agreeing with Nagashima
that the changes do not go far enough. According
to Morimoto, ‘Komeito played a significant role
in mediating between the LDP and the cabinet
lobby  groups.  [They  were  able  to  do  that]
because  they  have  a  long-establ ished
understanding  of  constitutional  and  legislative
issues  [their  own  political  leadership  being
lawyers],  and  they  have  been  involved  in  the
question of how to interpret the Constitution and
the issue of  CSD for a long time.  In a unique
position as a coalition partner with a thorough
knowledge  of  constitutional  law,  Komeito
opposed the engagement of the SDF in conflicts
or  wars  overseas  and  instead  supported  the
expansion of its PKO activities. Komeito is highly
regarded  [in  terms  of  its  knowledge]  both
amongst bureaucrats and within the LDP cabinet,
but  they  share  a  similar  diplomatic  approach
toward China [as the DP and the US], and are
inclined  to  engage  with  China  [rather  than
confront  i t ] .  Komeito  and  the  Chinese
Communist Party are very close and have a long
history of engagement. Although the number of
Komeito politicians is not large, each member of
the party has a vast network of supporters, and
LDP politicians rely on these Komeito supporters
to  get  elected… so  this  is  another  factor  that
influences the LDP… However, the main issue is
still how to deal with China.’30
Nagashima agrees with Morimoto and notes that
there is a split within the DP over the legislation.
He believes that the criticism of the use of CSD is
like  a  phantom  debate,  in  the  sense  that  the
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security legislation does not allow for CSD in its
true form and, in this regard, the legislation is
constitutional. ‘At first I supported the security
legislation, but it became a very limited form of
CSD that deals only with the defence of Japan.
This is actually because of Komeito.’ He outlines
how  he  believes  the  legislation  should  have
focused  on  the  situation  surrounding  Japan,
rather  than  merely  seeking  to  expand  PKO
activities.  ‘The  lack  of  focus  on  operational
management fell short in the areas surrounding
Japan  because  the  legislation  does  not  touch
upon the defence of territorial waters [in relation
to China].’ 31 In his view, the legislation is unable
to  respond  to  current  geo-political  challenges,
particularly in the area of the South China Sea.32
Many  policy  advisors  and  academics  of  geo-
politics and strategic studies agree with this view
and argue for greater use of CSD as a strategic
deterrence.33
Concerning  the  overlap  in  policy  between  the
previous DPJ government and the current Abe
administration, Nagashima comments: ‘When we
[the DPJ] proposed the revision [to the defence
guidelines],  we  weren’t  totally  ignoring  the
question of whether to go ahead with allowing
the exercise of the right of collective self-defence
from  the  outset.  But  we  started  bilateral
discussions with a view to the needs of those on
the  front  line,  and when the  LDP returned to
power [in Dec 2012], we passed our work on to
the Abe administration, which was eager to allow
the exercise of this right. That’s how the present
guidelines came into being. North Korea now has
more than two hundred Rodong missiles, which
are mobile and have a range that covers almost
all of the Japanese archipelago. It has built small
nuclear  warheads  that  can  be  mounted  on  its
missiles, some of which can now reach as far as
the  US mainland.  Meanwhile,  China’s  military
power is three or four times that of Japan’s.’34
We have seen the complex political background
that  surrounds  the  security  legislation  and
indicates  that  Komeito  prevented the push for
constitutional  revision  of  Article  9.  The  well-
known  political  commentator  Satō  Masaru
praises the legislation for having saved Article 9
while  attempting to  recognise  the  geo-political
reality.35  So  having  examined  the  political
background, let us look more closely at key parts
of the legislation.
Article  9  and  Article  13:  the  question  of
constitutionality
Article  9:  Aspiring  sincerely  to  an
international peace based on justice
and  order,  the  Japanese  people
forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or
use  of  force  as  means  of  settling
international disputes.
In  order  to  accomplish the aim of
the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained.
The right to belligerence of the state
will not be recognised.
Article 13: All of the people shall be
respected as individuals. Their right
to  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of
happiness shall, to the extent that it
does  not  interfere  with  the  public
w e l f a r e ,  b e  t h e  s u p r em e
consideration  in  legislation  and  in
other governmental affairs.
The  tension  between  forgoing  the  right  to
maintain a military force and the duty to protect
one’s citizens from a potential existential threat is
the pacifist conundrum, and one that questions
the  viability  of  a  non-violent  state.  This
conundrum and the contradiction in how it has
been  addressed  through  the  Yoshida  doctrine,
which allowed for US defence of Japan, including
nuclear defence, is an issue that has been hardly
touched upon in the current debate.
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Japan  has  clearly  demonstrated  its  desire  for
peace and renunciation of war over the past 70
years.  The  entire  opening  paragraph  of  the
Cabinet Decision of 1 July 2014 was inserted by
Komeito into the original LDP document in order
to stress Japan’s position as a nation devoted to
peace.
Since the end of World War II, Japan
has consistently followed the path of
a  peace-loving  nation  under  the
Constitution  of  Japan.  While
adhering  to  a  basic  policy  of
maintaining an exclusively national
defence-oriented  policy,  not
becoming  a  military  power  that
poses  a  threat  to  other  countries,
and  observing  the  Three  Non-
Nuclear  Principles,  Japan  has
flourished  as  an  economic  power
through  continuous  efforts  of  its
people  and  built  a  stable  and
affluent  livelihood.  Japan,  as  a
peace-loving  nation,  has  also  been
cooperating  with  the  international
community  and  international
organizations including the United
Nations (U.N.), and has proactively
contributed  to  their  activities,
adhering  to  the  Charter  of  the
United  Nations.  The  course  that
Japan has  taken as  a  peace-loving
nation  has  garnered  significant
praise  and  respect  f rom  the
international community, and Japan
must continue these steps to further
fortify such a position.36
Here,  the  emphasis  is  on  postwar  Japan  as  a
country  that  has  steadily  established  a  track-
record of peaceful intent and as a country that
adheres  to  internationally  agreed  structures  of
global  governance  centred  on  the  UN.
Strengthening  the  UN  and  increasing  Japan’s
contribution  to  an  international  community
committed to peace has been part of Komeito’s
vision  for  the  nation  for  a  long  time.  Most
commentators,  including Komeito,  refer  to this
position  as  being  based  on  Japan’s  ‘pacifism’
(heiwashugi);  however,  as  Japan  has  never
formally renounced its need for self-defence but
in reality has outsourced this function to the US,
it  could  be  argued that  Japan has  never  been
pacifist in the strict sense of the word.
By most standards, Article 9 might be regarded
as extremely idealistic  because it  stipulates the
position  of  a  pacifist,  non-violent  state.  Many
people,  particularly those who grew up in the
immediate post-war period, identify with Article
9 as a symbol of their pacifist intent and interpret
any discussion about changing the Constitution
as a  sign of  a  return to  right-wing militarism.
Thus,  while  the  majority  identify  with  the
concept of Japan as a pacifist nation, there have
been very few public discussions about how to
actually  achieve  and  maintain  this.  The  mass
media, the general public and politicians of all
persuasions  routinely  refer  to  Japan’s  ‘pacifist’
C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  p r e f e r  t o  a v o i d
acknowledgment of the role of the SDF within it,
but at the same time few argue that the SDF is
unnecessary or call for abolition of the US-Japan
security alliance. This reluctance to address the
need  for  preparedness  and  self-defence  in  the
public sphere because of deep sentiments linked
to  past  militarism  results  in  a  blurring  of
objectives  and  concerns  across  the  party
spectrum  and  activist  groups.
As discussed previously, the post-war defence of
Japan has mostly been undertaken by the U.S.
within  the  context  of  the  US-Japan  security
alliance.  "True  pacifists  do  not  allow  other
countries to protect them and fight their battles,
nor do they believe in only self-defence.’37  This
point  was  made  most  recently  by  the  veteran
political  observer  Ellis  Krauss,  who,  while
holding the ideals of Article 9 dear, asks whether
‘the gap between the wording of the Constitution
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and the way it has come to be interpreted and
implemented  without  revision  or  adequate
judicial  review  is  unhealthy  for  Japan’s
democracy, and actually aids the administration
of the moment in doing what it wants.’38
To see Japan’s Constitution as pacifist is possible
only if  the  sole  focus is  on Article  9.  What  is
rarely mentioned is the existence of Article 13,
which can be viewed as bestowing constitutional
legitimacy on the existence of the SDF as part of
the  government’s  duty  to  take  all  necessary
measures to ensure ‘the right to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness’ of the Japanese people.
Although in the past people argued against the
SDF  on  the  basis  that  a  defence  force  was
unconstitutional,  few  people  in  Japan  today
regard  the  maintenance  of  an  almost  quarter-
million strong self-defence force with powerful
naval  and  air  power  as  either  redundant  or
unconstitutional.  Article  9  was  part  of  the
Constitution created under the US occupation in
1946 and,  through the  decades  since  then,  the
government has interpreted it to allow for self-
defence  and  the  existence  of  the  Self-Defence
Forces that were established in 1954.
Thus  Article  13  has  been  the  legal  basis  for
establishing and maintaining the SDF. How one
interprets  the  constitutionality  of  the  current
security legislation hinges upon one’s view of the
SDF. If the SDF is regarded as constitutional, it
becomes  difficult  to  argue  that  the  current
security legislation is unconstitutional because it
is  limited  exclusively  to  self-defence.  If  one
regards  the  SDF as  unconstitutional,  then  any
role, let alone an expanded role, for the SDF is
unconstitutional.  As  we  have  seen  previously,
the conundrum of having no constitutional right
to maintain armed forces whilst also having the
constitutional duty to ensure people’s safety and
livelihood  was  addressed  by  the  Yoshida
doctrine through relying on the military umbrella
of  America,  which  allowed  Japan  to  remain
“pacifist” by shelving the issue of its own self-
defence.
Yet,  most Japanese constitutional scholars have
voiced their objections to the security legislation
based  on  the  view  that  it  is  unconstitutional
because it  allows Japan to engage in collective
self-defence. According to a survey by NHK, 377
out of  422 members (89%) of  the Japan Public
Law  Association  regarded  the  legislation  as
unconstitutional  and  only  28  members  (7%)
supported it as constitutional.39 As stated above,
this judgement hinges primarily upon how one
views the existence of the SDF and the extent to
which the activities of the SDF are considered to
be limited solely to Japan’s defence.40
Article 9 is significant in maintaining a ‘defence-
only’ position, but the argument that Article 9 in
itself equals peace and that an expansion of the
role  of  the  SDF  in  the  defence  of  Japan  to
supplement  defence  activit ies  already
undertaken by US forces equals a desire to go to
war  is  a  vast  oversimplification  and  ignores
many of the limitations and controls stipulated in
the  legislation  that  emerged  as  the  result  of
lengthy  negotiations.  It  also  ignores  the  real
contradictions that exist in the Yoshida doctrine
under the pretence of being pacifist.
In  the  debates,  rather  than  focusing  on
strengthening  such  controls,  emotions  have
tended to take over. For instance, Edano Yukio,
the  then  Secretary  General  of  the  Democratic
Party  (DP),  declared  at  the  party’s  founding
convention when the DPJ merged with the Japan
Innovation Party  on 27  March 2016:  ‘The  Abe
administration  is  destroying  the  constitutional
government, democracy, and the livelihoods of
people. There is not much time remaining to save
Japan.’41  This  assumes  a  clear  binary  divide
between  pro-constitutionalism  and  pro-
revisionism,  which  is  far  from  the  case,  and
largely  ignores  the  extensive  overlapping  of
positions  between  the  opposition  and  ruling
parties;  it  also fails to recognise the limitations
and  controls  put  in  place  largely  due  to  the
insistence of Komeito. As we have already seen,
the  DP is  not  unified  in  its  opposition  to  the
 APJ | JF 14 | 21 | 3
12
security legislation and the LDP does not speak
with one voice on the issue either.
According to Jimbo Ken, the current legislation
‘is a very complicated document with 11 bills and
472 pages. I was asked by the Upper House to
give an assessment so I was obliged to read it. It
has multi-layered meanings, which do not really
respond to the immediate geopolitical situation
of North East Asia, but its agenda reflects what
we  were  requested  to  respond  to  and  have
discussed  for  the  past  twenty  years.’42  In  this
view, the legislation does not represent a sudden
change  in  policy  but  reflects  continuous
discussions over the past twenty years. But if this
is true, why has it  roused so much opposition
now?
Prime Minister Abe’s wish to amend the second
paragraph of Article 9 has been clear since the
LDP issued the draft of a revised constitution in
April 2012 coinciding with the 60th anniversary of
the  San  Francisco  Peace  Treaty.  However,  the
National Referendum Law, which was enacted in
May 2007 by the first Abe cabinet, specified that
any constitutional amendment must be subject to
a national referendum and is not simply a matter
for parliamentarians to decide upon. From their
draft constitution it is clear that the LDP intend
to ‘make every effort to amend the constitution’
through  a  nat ional  referendum. 4 3  The
amendments proposed by the LDP include the
following three issues: 1) stipulating the Emperor
as  the  Head  of  State,  the  Rising  Sun  as  the
national  flag  and  Kimigayo  as  the  national
anthem,  2)  while  maintaining  its  long-held
pacifism, prescription of the right of self-defence,
the existence of the SDF and the maintenance of
territorial integrity; and 3) in the case of national
emergency,  including  armed  attack  by  foreign
countries, prescription of the right of the prime
minister to declare a state of emergency and take
measures in response.44 Issues 1) and 3) warrant a
separate article and may have consequences in
their  own right  for  driving a  more ideological
and  right-wing  agenda,  but  issue  2)  with  its
proposal to prescribe in the Constitution Japan’s
right to self-defence and the existence of the SDF
does not appear particularly radical  given that
the  SDF has  been in  existence  for  over  half  a
century and is widely accepted as constitutional
today.
The  LDP’s  objective  in  its  draft  revised
constitution was arguably a push for qualitative
change as argued comprehensively by Lawrence
Repeta.45  This has been the concern of Komeito
and its supporters as it may have been for the
opposition parties although Komeito has chosen
to deal with it differently. In the debate on the
security  legislation,  Komeito’s  objective  was to
make  it  consistent  with  previous  government
interpretations  that  regarded  the  right  to
collective  self-defence  as  unconstitutional.  The
result was that, in the end, the outcome differed
from the initial  LDP proposal.  Critics  point  to
inconsistency and, indeed, the government often
lacked  clarity  in  explaining  what  the  changes
entailed.  The  competing  political  interests  that
allowed  the  standard  of  judgement  to  be  set
through representing the “other” as a culprit also
obscured  the  fact  that  negotiations  were
continuously  being  pulled  back  to  pragmatics
over ideology. This, of course, is nothing new in
politics as we see such politicisation and populist
appeal in many situations throughout the world.
Yet,  the  rhetoric  of  binary  choices  prevents  a
public  discussion of  pragmatics,  of  nuances  in
positions,  and  how to  respond  to  a  changing
world  and  intertwines  in  complex  ways  with
taboos  and  strongly  held  sentiments  that
surround  any  discussion  of  Article  9.
Can  Japan  maintain  Article  9  and  respond  to
today’s geopolitical situation?
While  some  academics,  political  scientists  and
political  commentators  recognise  the  role  that
Komeito plays in Japanese politics,46 the majority
of  Japanese  voters  are  largely  unaware  of  the
ways in which the party has sought to address
the complex questions surrounding the security
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legislation. They are also unaware of Komeito’s
considerable  impact  on  the  shaping  of  the
following ‘three new conditions (sanyōken)’ that
significantly limit what Japan can do militarily
compared to the original document proposed by
the LDP. (I have shown in italics the words that
were inserted into the original document at the
insistence of Komeito.)
1)  When  an  armed  attack  against
Japan  occurs  or  when  an  armed
attack against a foreign country that
is in a close relationship with Japan
occurs  and  as  a  result  threatens
Japan’s  survival  and poses  a  clear
danger  to  fundamentally  overturn
people’s  right  to  life,  liberty  and
pursuit of happiness;
2 )  When  the re  a r e  no  o the r
appropriate means available to repel
the  attack  and  ensure  Japan’s
survival  to  protect  its  people;
3) Use of force should be limited to
the minimum extent necessary.
With  these  conditions  for  the  use  of  force  in
place,  Komeito  believes  that  Japan  can  both
maintain Article 9 and maintain a more realistic
capability of responding to today’s geopolitical
reality.  But  many  others  do  not  accept  this
middle-ground  approach  and  wish  to  either
maintain  the  previous  position  of  the  Yoshida
doctrine  or  revise  Article  9.  For  critics,  the
restrictions are too vague and the expansion of
the role of SDF goes too far by including a form
of CSD. Others argue that there are cases when
there is an overlap between the defence of Japan
(individual self-defence) and the defence of other
countries (collective self-defence).47 The details of
the  argument  lie  in  a  space  far  from populist
slogans  framed within  the  binary  ‘war  versus
peace’ discourse, so let us examine further some
of these issues.
‘“Under armed attack” is the condition for when
Japan can use force, but only to defend itself. It
spells out the exceptional measures when force
can be used,’ insists Komeito legislator Toyama
Kiyohiko, who was present at the discussions on
the  legislation  with  LPD  representatives  that
extended over more than 200 hours. In his view,
Article 9 sets up and remains the basic principle
of the Constitution and the use of force cannot be
recognised unless there is a threatened violation
of Article 13. ‘This seems to be the only way to
interpret  the  extensive  contradiction  between
these  two  art ic les .  Art ic le  13  requires
governments  to  protect  people,  but  Article  9
stipulates  that  the  use  of  force,  under  any
circumstances, is prohibited.’48
The Cabinet Decision on 1 July 2014, under the
section  on  ‘Measures  for  Self-Defence  under
Article  9  of  the  Constitution’,  states:49  ‘Such
measures  for  self-defence  are  permitted  only
when  they  are  inevitable  for  dealing  with
imminent unlawful situations where the people’s
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness
is  fundamentally  overturned due  to  an  armed
attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding
these rights of the people. Hence “use of force” to
the  minimum extent  necessary  to  that  end  is
permitted.’ Toyama stresses that ‘this is the so-
called  basic  logic  of  the  view  consistently
expressed by the government to date with regard
to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under
Article  9  of  the  Constitution.  This  is  clearly
shown in the document “Relationship between
the  Right  of  Collective  Self-Defence  and  the
Constitution” submitted by the Government to
the Committee Audit of the Upper House on 14
October  1972.  This  basic  logic  must  be
maintained  under  Article  9. ’ 5 0
If  this is the standard, official  interpretation of
the two contradictory articles of the Constitution
concerning self-defence rights and the legal use
of  force,  what  does  ‘to  the  minimum  extent
necessary’ mean? Toyama explains: ‘This means
that even when the Japanese forces are mobilised
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and allowed to use force against  an imminent
attack  by  a  foreign  country  or  by  a  random
people  and so  on,  once  those  attacking  forces
retreat, the mission of the SDF ends there. They
cannot pursue the enemy which initially attacked
Japan.  This  is  a  completely  different  approach
compared to the US or to the UK.’51 Hence, due to
constitutional restrictions, Japan is not permitted
to pursue an enemy to take revenge for an attack.
This important point has rarely been mentioned
in the Japanese media or by many of the scholars,
who  in  Toyama’s  view  apply  the  term  ‘war
legislation’ rather too liberally.
Furthermore,  he  explains  that  the  SDF  cannot
engage in operations that do not relate to the life,
liberty and pursuit of happiness of the Japanese
people: ‘It is not to protect US forces under attack
by Islamic State in the Middle East, for instance.
Japan cannot use force in this regard although
the US is the allied force of Japan.’52
Toyama continues: ‘This is the basic logic of the
view consistently expressed by the government
to date with agreement to use force only when
exceptionally permitted under Article 9, and this
is  important.  Why  the  exception?  Because  the
basic logic of Article 9 is not to use force, even for
se l f -de fence .  However ,  when  we  are
fundamentally  threatened,  when it  is  a  life  or
death situation, then the SDF can use force. But
to the extent that the enemy retreats, we cannot.
If they continue attacking, of course the SDF can
use force and the US military will also come to
help, which is permitted as part of Japan’s self-
defence.’53
The  statement,  ‘This  basic  logic  must  be
maintained under Article 9’, was inserted into the
Cabinet Decision at the last minute by Komeito,
because of the fear, shared by left-wing critics,
that those LDP politicians who wanted to argue
for  revision  of  Article  9  might  try  to  use  the
document  to  justify  such  a  move.  Toyama
explains: ‘Komeito’s position is that we do not
have to change Article 9 in order to protect Japan,
nor  in  order  to  strengthen  our  all iance
partnership with the US. Instead, we are already
doing that even under Article 9.’54 From working
in  close  proximity  with  LDP  decision-making
circles, Komeito politicians such as Toyama are
well  aware  that  right-wing  conservative
members  wanted the negotiations  between the
LDP and Komeito to fail; this was due to their
dissatisfaction over  the  limitations  imposed by
Komeito that hindered their objective of moving
towards revising revision of Article 9.
It  was  against  this  background  that  Komeito
insisted on the three new conditions discussed
above, by which future governments would have
to judge any potential deployment of the SDF.
Fear  of  involvement  in  war  is  a  legitimate
concern but, as Ellis Krauss suggested, to fail to
precisely to specify the role of the SDF in a way
that corresponds with today’s reality potentially
increases  the  risk  of  arbitrary  decisions  being
made  when  a  situation  occurs  that  requires  a
response.  The  decision  to  deploy  the  SDF
overseas should be the last resort, as in any other
democracy,  but  the  existence  of  these  three
conditions  means  that  any  decision  by  the
government can be referred to the scrutiny of the
Supreme Court  to  judge  whether  it  meets  the
conditions.
Abe’s original argument presented in his book
Utsukushii  kuni  e  [Towards  establishing  a
beautiful  country]  published  in  2006  was  that
Japan as a member state of the UN had the right
to both individual and collective self-defence as
clearly stated in Article 51 of the UN Convention.
Hence, despite the existence of Article 9, Japan
had the right to exercise CSD as stipulated by
international  law.  However,  during  more  than
100  hours  of  intense  theoretical,  constitutional
and legal discussions between representatives of
the LDP and Komeito (including Toyama) that
took place between May and July 2014, ‘Abe as
the prime minister dropped that position, which
is why he accepted what Komeito asserted to be
the three new conditions upon which any future
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government  will  have  to  judge  whether  to
employ  the  limited  exercise  of  CSD  for  self-
defence only.55
The  more  this  perspective  is  challenged,  the
greater the likelihood of a push for a full revision
of  Article  9  as  a  result  of  the  increasing
geopolitical  tension  that  makes  it  difficult  to
argue  that  some  form  of  preparedness  is
unnecessary. The pressure from the US on Japan
to  carry  more  of  the  burden  of  its  own  self-
defence  also  continues.  As  mentioned  above,
when discussions between the LDP and Komeito
initially  began,  some  senior  LDP  politicians
wanted  the  discussions  to  collapse.  Why?  ‘If
discussions had ended unsuccessfully, they could
use that as a major reason to justify their new
movement  to  change the  Japanese  constitution
itself,’ explains Toyama.56
The President  of  Komeito,  Yamaguchi  Natsuo,
described Komeito’s  intentions in  an interview
with the Mainichi Shimbun:
In  our  initial  years,  we  were  an
opposition party and I cannot deny
that  what  we  advocated  was  a
theoretical  pacifism  against  the
backdrop of  the Cold War.  It  was
after we faced the Gulf War and the
UN peacekeeping  operations  there
that  we  set  out  to  work  on  the
question of how Japan’s peace could
be protected in a practical sense. It
was  during  this  t ime  that  we
discussed  and  modif ied  our
approach to security policy and the
Self-Defence Forces to help draft the
International Peace Cooperation Act
and  the  so-called  ‘emergency-at-
periphery  laws’,  which  eventually
led to  the  new security  legislation
today.  As  you  know,  the  security
bills  were  proposed  by  the  LDP.
Komeito  responded  in  a  realistic
manner . . . our goal was to impose
limitations on the legislation while
respecting the original intentions of
the  Constitution  and  emphasizing
the legal stability that has developed
over the years.57
Yamaguchi  stated  at  an  early  stage  of  the
negotiations that Komeito would not leave the
coalition because of disagreement with the LDP
on the issue of the security legislation. He was
immediately criticised by the media for  giving
away what was considered to be his negotiating
trump card. My understanding of the situation,
however, is quite different. Yamaguchi’s trump
card was to state publicly that Komeito would
not leave the coalition, thus preventing any push
from conservative forces that hoped the coalition
would break down.58
Why  would  Komeito  allow  that  to  happen?
According  to  Nakano,  Komeito’s  apparent
compromise is due to lack of courage to become
an opposition party again, but Toyama explains
as follows: ‘Some LDP politicians today lament
that  the  LDP  has  been  pushed  too  much  by
Komeito. But when they read articles that present
Komeito as just a follower or state that Komeito
has been pushed by the LDP, or when they read
articles that describe what was once taboo in the
history and philosophy of Komeito [in its long
history of opposing the right-wing of the LDP]
and that Komeito is now giving in to them, they
are very happy.’59
This is a paradox because, in reality, Komeito’s
influence  appears  to  be  increasing  on  various
levels,  as can be seen in the LDP’s reliance on
Komeito supporters during elections and also in
the  calibre  of  its  policy  arguments  and  its
standing among civil  servants,  as  observed by
Morimoto60  and  other  journalists  and  political
scientists  with  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the
political scene. For instance, Sōga Takeshi credits
Komeito with having a “censoring” role and a
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“cooling” effect on Japanese politics through its
emphasis on trying to deepen the understanding
of all parties about the issues involved. Sōga is an
experienced  political  commentator  and  Asahi
staff writer who worries about the representation
of political issues that have a huge influence on
public  perception  but  may  not  be  well
understood.
For  Sōga,  such  a  case  was  the  major  political
platform presented by the opposition parties in
the July Upper House election to preventing the
ruling  coalition  (the  LDP  and  Komeito)  from
achieving a two-thirds majority.
A  ghastly  spectre  is  stalking
Japan—the power of the two-thirds
majority to amend the Constitution.
The  situation  itself  is  not  well
understood, but the number seems
to have taken on a life of its own as a
huge dreadful thing, an image that
continues to grow and assert a huge
influence on politics.61
More concretely in terms of Komeito’s influence,
Mikuriya Takashi,  an emeritus professor at the
University  of  Tokyo  and  a  long-term political
observer,  points  to  a  qualitative  shift  in  the
increasing  reliance  of  bureaucrats  on  Komeito
rather  than  LDP  politicians  for  advice  and
consultation.62
According  to  bureaucrats  in
Kasumigaseki, members of Komeito,
be  it  parliamentarians  or  their
secretaries,  are  impressively
zealous. They visit Kasumigaseki to
directly  ask  bureaucrats  questions
again  and  again  until  they  are
satisfied. You don’t often find those
kinds  of  people  in  today’s  LDP…
Basically,  they  engage  with  and
study  everything  seriously.  And
what’s more, there are an increasing
number of  lawyers  and University
of Tokyo graduates among them, so
it is not surprising that Komeito is
able to talk the same language as the
bureaucrats.  So  we  can  now view
talking  to  Komeito  as  a  means  of
persuading the LDP63.
The  devil  is  in  the  details:  the  three  new
conditions for SDF deployment
In  this  section,  we  will  look  carefully  at  the
words that were inserted by Komeito in the text
of ‘the three new conditions’ before the Cabinet
Decision  on  1  July  2014;  they  may  appear  as
minor alterations but they play a crucial role in
limiting  the  potential  use  of  military  force.  In
condition  1)  ‘when  an  armed attack  against  a
foreign country that is in a close relationship with
Japan  occurs  and as  a  result  threatens  Japan’s
survival’, the addition by Komeito of the words
‘as  a  result’  makes  clear  the  necessity  of  a
relationship of causality between the attack on
the foreign country and the threat to Japan. The
insertion  of  the  words  ‘that  is  in  a  close
relationship  with  Japan’  further  limits  the
occasions on which military force can be used
and leaves  considerably  less  room for  ad  hoc
judgements by the ruling government than the
original  wording.  According  to  Toyama:  ‘In
parliamentary discussions that lasted more than
200 hours,  the opposition repeatedly sought to
clarify  the  meaning  of  ‘in  a  close  relationship
with Japan’. Komeito submitted guidance to the
government  on  how  to  answer  this  question
based  on  the  interpretation  that  ‘a  foreign
country that is in a close relationship with Japan’
is  actually  a  country  which  is  engaged  in
defending Japan from a potential enemy.’64
These  conditions  send  a  message  to  the
international community that Japan is not willing
to use force unless Japan itself or another country
in a close relationship with it is under attack and
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as  a  result  Japanese  people’s  lives  are  under
threat; otherwise, it is not legally possible to use
force. ‘This means that Japan will remain one of
the most peaceful and peace-oriented nations in
the world,’ says Toyama. ‘Most parliamentarians
know  this,  unless  they  haven’t  studied  very
much. Most of us are highly confident that unless
the  government  betrays  these  conditions  [in
which case the matter would go to the Supreme
Court] then these new conditions will not change
Japan from what it was before.’65
Opponents have criticised these new conditions
on the basis that they allow for CSD. This is one
possible  interpretation  as,  until  now,  the  SDF
could not be mobilised unless Japan itself  was
under attack, but now they can come to the aid of
US forces if  they are attacked while protecting
Japan.66  For example, if  the US navy patrolling
the Sea of Japan was attacked by North Korean
missiles, the SDF would not have been able to
come to their aid before the new legislation was
enacted,  because  no  Japanese  ships  had  been
directly hit.  Toyama explains: ‘Now in light of
such  a  scenario,  i f  US  ships  engaged  in
operations to  protect  Japan come under  attack
and we know that if we don’t do anything those
military  ships  will  be  destroyed—what  is  the
next target? It is likely that it will be Japan. In this
situation under the new conditions it is possible
to mobilise the SDF, even though it is not Japan
but  those  protecting  Japan  that  have  been
attacked. It is only for this purpose that there has
been  a  slight  expansion  of  the  constitutional
interpretation. Although this could be effectively
regarded  as  collective  self-defence  under
international law, it is a very specific and limited
expansion  that  does  not  extend  to  other
situations,  such  as  engaging  in  joint  military
operations with the US in Latin America, North
Africa or the Middle East.’67
A  controversy  arose  following  the  Cabinet
Decision on 14 May 2015 over whether the new
conditions  could  be  used  to  allow for  Japan’s
participation in minesweeping operations in the
Strait of Hormuz.68 The government’s reluctance
to clarify exactly what kind of situation would be
judged ‘a clear threat’ to Japan as defined by the
three conditions gave rise to concern. On several
occasions,  Prime  Minister  Abe  alarmed  many
with assertions that the conditions could be used
to justify the use of the SDF for minesweeping in
this area through which 80% of Japan’s imported
crude  oil  passes.  After  repeated  attempts  to
clarify  this  issue  by  Komeito  politicians,
Yamaguchi Natsuo, the president of Komeito, in
a  role  normally  played  by  the  opposition,
questioned  the  prime  minister  and  finally
succeeded in  pushing him to  clarify  that  such
activities  would  not  be  justified  under  the
security legislation.69
Toyama also believes that conditions 2) and 3)
are  of  vital  importance:  ‘For  example if  North
Korea  declares  that  they  are  going  to  attack
Japan, we would first resort to diplomatic and
UN influence  to  stop  that  declared  attack  on
Japan. If they stop, then there is no need for the
SDF to use force. So this is clearly stated in the
second condition.’ Referring to the insertion by
Komeito of the words ‘protect its people’ in the
third condition: ‘This is coherent with the notion
that the SDF is allowed to use force always as an
exceptional  measure  in  light  of  constitutional
restraints in order to protect people—not for any
other reason. It was to clarify this that “to protect
its people” was inserted’.70
Komeito supporters and the security legislation
Had  Komeito  been  solely  reliant  on  public
opinion  and  not  benefitted  from a  committed
supporter base that largely came to understand
and trust what it was doing, it may not have been
able  to  survive  as  a  party  in  the  face  of  the
onslaught of accusations of having compromised
its  principles  of  peace.  However,  building
understanding and trust is an ongoing process.
Komeito’s complex, middle-ground position has
not  been  easily  understood  and  was  not
acceptable to all of its supporters, at least in the
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beginning. Many of its supporters are personally
engaged in various peace-related activities, and
their  own philosophy and practice of  Nichiren
Buddhism is  about  living  in  such  a  way  that
considers the interests of others. With a label of
‘war’ attached to this legislation backed by their
party, how did supporters respond?
Komeito supporters  of  Takeya Toshiko in July
2016
Komeito supporters whom I interviewed during
June and July 2015 expressed apprehension about
a possible push by conservative LDP politicians
to revise Article 9. The desire to ‘protect Article 9’
was unanimously seen as important, but did not
necessarily  entail  opposition  to  the  security
legislation.  ‘Specifying  what  the  SDF  can  and
cannot do seems a valid argument to me in terms
of actual operational functions. I also agree with
the  importance  of  peace-keeping  operations,
which  I  support  as  a  way  of  contributing  to
refugee problems and other humanitarian issues
under the UN,’  explained a man in his  fifties,
while others nodded in agreement. ‘Yes, but we
need  to  keep  Article  9,’  added  another  man.
‘Have you joined the current protests against the
security legislation?’ I asked. ‘I don’t really like to
join protests and I don’t think they achieve much.
It’s not that I’m against demonstrations—maybe
sometimes they are important—but the current
issues  seem to have become very simplified.  I
don’t think the label of “war legislation” is fair or
accurate,’ a women in her forties chipped in.
Yet, it was clearly an issue of discussion in the
lead-up to the July 2016 Upper House election. ‘I
prefer  to  talk  with  people  and  discuss  issues
directly [rather than attending demonstrations],
but I believe that Komeito is doing what it can to
protect Article 9,’ another woman in her forties
told me, before going on to express her view that
the three new conditions were intended to define
the  role  of  the  SDF  as  self-defence  only.
‘However,  I  don’t  really  understand  all  the
details  as  it  is  so  complicated,’  she  admitted.
How to judge the complexity of the details of the
legislation  and  what  was  good  for  Japan’s
defence  and  for  international  relations  was
clearly  an  issue  for  many  supporters.
Supporters often find Komeito’s middle-ground
position  of  neither  all-out  opposing  nor
supporting the revision of Article 9 a difficult one
to explain to friends and those they canvass for
their votes. One active female supporter in her
mid-fifties, who lives in central Tokyo, told me
after  the  July  2016  election:  ‘Always  after  an
election, I go back to my friends who supported
Komeito to thank them. When I called this time,
they all  said,  “Please  make sure  that  Komeito
really does stick to its promise regarding Article
9.”’ This was clearly a topic that often came up in
conversation, as was the perceived danger of the
ruling coalition achieving its two-thirds majority.
I  also  observed  many  dialogues  where
supporters were unsuccessful in persuading their
friends who, because of their dislike and distrust
of Prime Minister Abe, were not going to vote for
Komeito this time, even if they had in the past.
Clearly, supporters expend considerable effort on
the  one-on-one  level  in  making  the  case  for
Komeito’s middle-ground position, but this is not
always successful  against  the  background of  a
mass media in which a binary discourse prevails
and Komeito is largely portrayed as giving in to
the  LDP rather  than exerting influence  on the
outcome.
I  have conducted extensive  first-hand research
focused  on  direct  observations  of  election
activities  and,  over  the  years,  have  attended
hundreds of meetings and smaller gatherings of
Soka  Gakkai  members  who  support  Komeito,
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talking  to  them  about  the  reasons  for  their
support and the issues on which they agree and
disagree.  These meetings,  mainly in Tokyo but
also extensively in Okinawa, reveal that Komeito
supporters  are  not  unanimous  in  their  views.
However,  those  that  canvass  actively  for  the
party are broadly in agreement with its liberal
and  people-oriented  political  philosophy  and
believe that the party ‘provides a more nuanced
approach to Japanese politics where a left-right
ideology tends to  prevail,’  as  expressed by an
active  campaigner  in  his  early  thirties  from
central Tokyo. Many have personal contact with
local  politicians,  which  creates  a  sense  of
‘closeness’ to politics: ‘We can always contact our
local MP about anything, which is a surprise to
many  of  my  friends  who  see  polit ics  as
something  that  happens  far  away  from  their
personal  lives,’  says  a  women  from Okinawa,
who had brought her friend to her local MP to
raise  the  issue  of  the  lack  of  help  for  autistic
children.  The fact  that  supporters  tend to find
their local Komeito representatives approachable
and helpful creates a level of trust and openness
in their  discussion of  policies,  especially  when
this occurs in smaller meetings.
However, as the public debate about the security
legislation became increasingly politicised, even
active  supporters  could  be  found  questioning
what exactly the party was doing with regard to
the  issue  of  constitutional  revision.  ‘I  worry
about  any  talks  about  changing  Article  9  and
want  to  be  clear  about  the  role  that  Komeito
plays in ensuring Article 9 is kept intact… I had
to get it clear in my mind that the war-label used
by the JCP was not true before I could explain it
to  my friends  with  any confidence,’  explained
one young woman,  while  also telling me how
difficult  it  was  to  understand  the  various
arguments  about  constitutionality.
Some people in their fifties and from the older
generation, who had supported the party’s stance
on PKO activities in the past, also began to feel
that  the  current  legislation  was  going  too  far.
‘Komeito’s position has changed in allowing for
collective  self-defence  which  is  not  acceptable
under Article 9,’ said a man around the age of
fifty, who had been a Komeito supporter but now
sometimes  joined  the  anti-security  legislation
demonstrations in front of the Diet. When I asked
if he disagreed with the SDF being allowed to
come  to  the  aid  of  US  forces  engaged  in  the
defence of Japan, he replied: ‘I suppose it makes
sense theoretically. Why should it be okay for US
soldiers to risk their lives defending Japan but
not  Japanese  soldiers  so  that  they  can  remain
pacifist?  I  see  the  contradiction,  but  I  am still
apprehensive  about  any  change  to  Article  9.
R a t h e r  t h an  wo r k i ng  w i t h  t h e  Ab e
administration, I would like to see Komeito join
the opposition again.’71
Not all who vote for the party are necessarily that
interested  in  politics,  but  in  my  observation,
active supporters usually make an effort to study
the details of policies and try to come to grips
with the main points. ‘I can agree to the kaken
position72 of adding legislation to clarify the role
of  SDF.  Also,  I  support  some  constitutional
change  such  as  environmental  rights,  but  I
cannot support changes being made to Article 9
and its renunciation of war,’ a male supporter in
his  forties  told me at  a  gathering with a local
Komeito politician in June 2015. The discussion at
this meeting was so frank and the atmosphere so
informal  that  I  did  not  initially  realise  that
supporters  were  talking  with  their  local
representative  rather  than  with  a  well-versed
colleague. At the meeting, two female supporters
in their fifties admitted that they found both the
legislation and what the party was doing very
difficult to understand; they concluded that they
needed to study more.
Many supporters engage in smaller study groups
in the lead-up to an election and, as described
above,  gatherings  are  sometimes  attended  by
local  politicians.  These  direct  interactions  have
been  s ign i f i can t  in  t e rms  o f  ga in ing
understanding from supporters, some of whom
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did not  immediately  accept  or  understand the
security legislation proposals. Small meetings to
ask  questions  and  hear  about  recent  policy
initiatives are also held regularly at which a local
politician  will  attend,  whom many  supporters
will  know  on  a  personal  level.  Taken  on  a
nationwide scale,  this  creates  a  vast  grassroots
network of interaction between supporters and
their  representatives,  which  to  some  extent
substantiates Komeito’s claim to be bringing the
voice of ordinary people to politics.
Many  larger  gatherings  also  take  place  and
national politicians have been able to use these as
a forum to explain Komeito’s stance towards and
impact  on  the  security  legislation.  Reports  of
these meetings tend to be limited to Komeito’s
own news outlets as they are rarely featured in
the mass media. Thus it is either through such
news organs or by hearing about issues directly
from  politicians  that  supporters  gain  an
understanding  of  what  their  party  is  doing.
Komeito’s  national  politicians  have  made  a
concerted effort to explain and gain support for
the  party’s  stance.  For  example,  Toyama
crisscrossed Kyushu and other areas speaking at
numerous  larger  and  smaller  gatherings  to
increase  understanding  of  the  legislation.
Sometimes  heated  debates  erupt  at  these,  but
many who attended such gatherings appeared to
have had some of  their  concerns  allayed.  One
man in his sixties remarked, ‘I still have mixed
feelings about any changes related to Article 9.
However, I now feel reassured that the party will
ensure that Article 9 remains unchanged and that
what they are trying to achieve is necessary to be
more relevant in today’s world.’73
From observing such activities  and conducting
numerous group and individual interviews with
supporters including both Soka Gakkai members
and non-members, I concluded that the majority
had come to largely endorse Komeito’s position
on keeping Article 9 intact and adding additional
legislation to stipulate a slightly expanded role
for  the  SDF.  In  their  support  for  Article  9,
everyone agreed with the sentiments expressed
by a  young man from Okinawa who had just
returned from a trip in July 2015 to engage with
counterparts  in  China  that  ‘continuous
diplomatic  effort  and  dialogue  are  the  most
crucial processes for achieving peace.’ A similar
emphasis  on  dialogue  was  expressed  by  an
enthusiastic young woman who was a member of
the Soka Gakkai Okinawa Peace Committee:  ‘I
am  personally  committed  to  having  dialogue
with anyone to sort out any differences.’ At the
same  time,  many  agreed  that  ‘operational
preparedness may be necessary to actually know
how to react in the face of potential conflict.’
Soka Gakkai Okinawa Youth Peace Committee performs a drama about the
Okinawa Battle as part of their ‘Peace-action’ campaign of 2015. Performed
at the Soka Gakkai Training Centre in Okinawa, a former missile launch site
under the US occupation.
Over  the  past  two  and  half  years  since  the
beginning of talks on the security legislation, I
have  observed  and  have  been  told  by  many
suppor te r s  tha t  a l though  somewhat
apprehensive about the legislation due to media
reports  and  protest  movements  with  people
holding placards reading ‘Don’t let Japan go to
war!’ and ‘Protect peace!’, they did not take part
in  such  protests  themselves.  A  small  minority
may have participated in such protests in front of
the Diet and no longer support Komeito because
of  the  legislation,  but  the  vast  majority  of
supporters do not regard protesting as the way
they wish to engage in the political process even
if  they  are  sympathetic  to  the  concerns
expressed.74 ‘I feel that right-wing forces are a big
influence in Japanese politics, and I do not think
there is much support [from Komeito supporters]
for some of the LDP candidates in my area where
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no Komeito candidates are standing. But I don’t
express this in the form of protest. The only way
is to try to transform such attitudes and beliefs,’
says a young woman in her twenties, adding, ‘I
believe Komeito is  trying to do that within its
specific political circles.’
In the recent Upper House election on 10 July
2016,  Komeito  obtained  seven  seats  in  the
multiple-seat  election  districts  and  seven
proportional representation seats, thus securing
an overall  increase  of  five  seats.  These  results
help to  confirm my observations that  Komeito
maintains a committed base of supporters who
understand to some extent the arguments for the
legislation  and  are  aware  of  their  party’s
influence  on  the  final  legislative  outcome.
The outlook for constitutional revision
In  this  article,  I  have  argued  that  a  more
substantial  and  detailed  discussion  has  been
largely eclipsed by the heated rhetoric that has
filled  the  public  sphere.  In  these  last  few
paragraphs, I would like to consider the future
outlook for  revision of  the constitution and of
Article 9 in particular.
Everyone agrees that it is not easy to revise the
Constitution—not  only  does  any  proposed
change need a two-thirds majority approval in
the Diet, it also requires a national referendum
on revision. Vice-president of the LDP, Komura
Masahiko, stated on 26 July 2016 that although
the majority  of  LDP members  see the need to
revise Article 9, ‘We can’t do so,’ and ‘we won’t
do what we can’t.’75
Various  parties  agree  upon  a  number  of
initiatives  that  might  appear  in  a  revised
constitution:  stipulating  the  right  to  free
education; the establishment of a constitutional
court;  restructuring  the  relationship  between
central  government and prefectural  authorities;
possible  changes  to  the  bicameral  political
structure  of  the  Diet;  and  new  human  rights
legislation  including  specific  environmental
rights and rights to privacy. Revision of Article 9
and the role of SDF is just one of the potential
i tems  for  inclusion.  I t  is  a lso  the  most
controversial .
So  far,  however,  any  talk  about  constitutional
change has resulted in accusations of a return to
the  right-wing  militarism  of  Japan’s  past.  As
argued in this article, this inflames and simplifies
many  complex  issues  that  require  careful
scrutiny  and  debate.  This  was  the  subject  of
various media reports after the July 2016 election,
many of which recognised the central role played
by  Komeito  in  the  current  debates.  Jeffrey
Hornung  in  the  magazine  Foreign  Affairs
commented that ‘Changes to Article 9 will face
the  most  scrutiny,  mostly  owing  to  Komeito’s
opposition to revising that clause.’76 And in the
same article,  it  concluded:  ‘If  Japan revises  its
constitution after lengthy debates in Diet and a
national referendum, it will not mean the country
is returning to militarism: it will be a sign of a
healthy democracy in action.’
This  does  not  mean  that  right  wing  rhetoric
should be dismissed as insignificant; it clearly is
not.  However,  even  though  the  Abe  coalition
made  significant  gains  in  the  Upper  House
election on 10 July,  constitutional revisions are
not an easy feat to accomplish and, as the past
few years have proven, the biggest challenge is
likely to be Komeito’s insistence on maintaining
Article  9.  During  the  election  campaign,
Komeito’s  president,  Yamaguchi  Natsuo,  made
the following comments during a TV programme
on the BS Asahi channel:
The government created the security
legislation package and defined the
limits of interpretation of the current
Constitution.  They  are  defined  so
precisely  that  any  use  of  armed
force  beyond  them  will  require
constitutional  change.  We  need  to
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see  how  far  this  legislation  can
succeed  in  protecting  Japan  and
contributing  to  the  international
community  under  the  current
Constitution.  There  is  no  need  to
revise  Article  9  immediately.  The
bottom line is to maintain Article 9.77
To initiate constitutional change, at least 100 MPs
in the Diet’s Lower House or at least 50 MPs in
the Upper House are required to submit a bill
proposing  constitutional  amendments.  This
would be followed by lengthy discussion, which
may or may not result in a two-thirds majority in
both  houses  passing  the  bill.  To  achieve  its
passage, the LDP would require the support not
only of Komeito, but also of Nippon Ishin no Kai
(an  Osaka-based  party)  and  the  conservative
Nihon no Kokoro o Taisetsu ni suru Tō (Party for
Japanese  Kokoro);  this  would  be  difficult  to
achieve as  the  parties  differ  in  their  views on
what  should  be  revised.  Thus,  before  a  draft
could be voted on, MPs from each party would
have to  reach agreement  in  order  to  submit  a
final draft for introduction to the Diet for debate.
Any proposals  for  changes to  Article  9  would
face  severe  scrutiny before  such a  submission,
primarily because of Komeito’s opposition to its
revision. There are some in the party who argue
for adding a clause to Article 9 to recognise the
existence of the SDF, but there is as yet no party
consensus on this.78
If  finally, after prolonged debate, two-thirds of
both houses voted in favour of the constitutional
proposals,  they  would  have  to  be  put  to  a
national  referendum.  This  public  vote  would
almost  certainly  be  accompanied  by  heated
debate  amongst  opposition  parties  and  street
protests similar to those surrounding the security
legislation. Obtaining a public vote of confidence
would  require  an  enormous  effort  by  any
promoters of constitutional change, particularly
if it involved revision of Article 9.
Terasaki  Hirotsugu,  the vice president  of  Soka
Gakkai,  who  recognises  Komeito’s  moderating
influence on the security legislation, is adamant
that  constitutional  change  will  not  be  easily
achieved.
Some predict  that  the  government
will  immediately  begin  moving
toward  constitutional  change  as
soon as the ruling coalition obtains a
two-thirds  majority  in  the  Upper
House  election.  I  think  it  is  very
unlikely,  and  even  more  so  with
Article  9.  It  would  not  be  easy.
Regarding  the  security  bills  that
were passed last September [2015],
the  leg is la t ive  process  was
completed  with  much  difficulty,
during  which  Komeito  repeatedly
held  discussions  with  the  LDP  to
ensure  the  laws  comply  with  the
framework of the Constitution and
Article  9  in  particular.  I  do  not
believe that the ruling coalition has
the extra energy left to further revise
those  bills,  into  which  enormous
efforts have been invested, in order
to change Article 9…
… During the discussions with the
LDP  on  the  bill  for  the  national
referendum  necessary  for  any
constitutional  change  in  2007,
Komeito  insisted  that  the  law
requires  a  referendum  in  which
voters  place  a  vote  for  each  and
every item to be amended instead of
a vote simply between plan A and
plan B for the entire constitutional
text.  This  is  how  the  national
referendum law, which had been an
inadequate  part  in  the  process  of
constitutional revision, was adopted
during the first Abe administration.
With this process in place, changing
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the Constitution is not easy unless
public debate over each item takes
place in order to do so.79
It is clear that those representing Komeito’s main
support base are confident in the effectiveness of
the democratic process and the party’s ability to
influence policy. The crucial aspect required to
enable  meaningful  and  constructive  debate  to
take place remains, as suggested by this research,
an  informed,  non-ideological  discussion  that
helps  inform  public  opinion  on  the  issues
involved. As we have seen during the security
legislation debates over the past couple of years,
this is not how politics tends to work; however,
this article provides grounds for hope that the
middle-ground  of  informed  political  decision-
making will continue to carry the day.
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